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BANKING LAW
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Defenses To Payment-Parol Evidence Problems
In commercial paper jargon there are two classes of defenses to the
payment of a negotiable instrument: "real" defenses and "personal"
defenses. Real defenses are simply factual allegations which negate the
consent of the party whose signature forms the foundation of the lawsuit,
thereby denying that any obligation ever came into being,' or still exists
in legal contemplation. 2 Real defenses are assertable against any holder
of the instrument.3 Personal defenses are factual allegations that do not
deny the existence of an obligation on the instrument, but thwart recovery
by the holder who is not a holder in due course based on a contractual
defense such as failure of performance, 4 prior payment or other discharge,5
mistaken issuance, or misrepresentation as to the effect or consequences
of the signature. 6
For the most part, the legal issues that revolve around the assertion
of defenses are cut-and-dried: the plaintiff either is or is not a holder
in due course who either did or did not deal with the defendant;' the
defendant either has a defense or has not; his defense is either real or
personal. 8 The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) clearly permits the maker
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1. LA. R.S. 10:3-305(2)(a)-(c) (1983).
2. LA. R.S. 10:3-305(2)(d)-(e) (1983).
3. LA. R.S. 10:3-305(2) (1983).
4. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2046. Courts in Louisiana typically adopt the common-law
jargon of "want or failure of consideration" in cases to which article 2046 applies. The
UCC refers to the "nonperformance of any condition precedent." LA. R.S. 10:3-306(c) (1983).
5. Discharges in insolvency proceedings, and any discharge of which the holder had
notice when he took the instrument are treated as real defenses by the UCC. LA. R.S.
10:3-305(2)(d)-(e) (1983).
6. Misrepresentation can be a real defense where the party signing was induced to
do so having neither knowledge of the character or essential terms of what he has signed
nor a reasonable opportunity to obtain such knowledge. LA. R.S. 10:3-305(2)(c) (1983).
7. Personal defenses are assertable against a holder in due course by one with whom
the holder in due course dealt. LA. R.S. 10:3-305(2) (1983).
8. Quick-witted lawyers occasionally can play games with the defenses by characteriz-.
ing as "real" what is essentially a personal defense. The case of Tyson v. Associates Inv.
Co., 331 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) provides an example: a dishonest automobile
dealer, entrusted with the buyer's signed promissory note, blank as to amount, completed
the note in a larger sum than that to which the parties had agreed, then negotiated the
note to a holder in due course. If the Tyson facts are characterized as an unauthorized
completion of a delivered but partially blank instrument, only a personal defense has been
asserted. But the buyer's lawyer in Tyson characterized the difference between the amount
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or drawer to assert against one who is not a holder in due course the
defense of nonperformance of any condition precedent.9 In some cases,
however, the assertion of a personal defense amounts to the assertion of
parol evidence which contradicts the unambiguous terms of the note itself;
whether this parol evidence is admissible has long been a troublesome
issue for courts. The UCC treats the matter of extrinsic written agreements
in section 3-119(1)," permitting such agreements to modify the terms of
a negotiable instrument, but only as between the obligor and his immediate
obligee or a transferee who is not a holder in due course who had notice
of the separate written agreement. Section 3-119 is designed to prevent
negotiability from being affected by contemporaneously executed separate
agreements commonly accompanying notes, such as mortgages and pledges,
and to permit such collateral agreements to be enforced even if modifica-
tion of the unambiguous terms of the note is the result.'I The UCC com-
ment 1 to section 3-119 concedes, however, that the section does not
attempt to state general rules as to when an unambiguous instrument may
be varied or affected by parol evidence.
The UCC and its comments are not silent on the issue of parol or
oral proof, 2 but in general, resolution of the issue is a matter of deference
to local law." Local law uniformly holds that evidence of an oral agree-
ment made prior to, or contemporaneously with, the execution of the in-
strument is not admissible to vary or contradict the unambiguous terms
of the instrument.'" Among the typical exceptions to the rule are cases
in which parol evidence is admissible to prove fraud, mistake, illegality,
want or failure of consideration" or to explain an ambiguity or to show
that the writing is only a part of a broader oral agreement between the
agreed to and the amount actually filled in on the note as an addition of usurious interest.
Usury is considered to be a real defense in many jurisdictions. See Huntington v. Budden-
dorff, 5 Orl. App. 23 (La. 1907).
9. LA. R.S. 10:3-306(c) (1983).
10. LA. R.S. t0:3-119(l) (1983).
11. LA. R.S. 10:3-119, U.C.C. comment 1 (1983).
12. UCC comment I to section 3-414, for example, states that an indorser can disclaim
his engagement as an indorser only by making the disclaimer a part of the indorsement
itself, and that the disclaimer "cannot be proved by parol." Section 3-415 permits oral
proof of accommodation status against any holder who is not a holder in due course without
notice of accommodation. UCC comment I to section 3-417 provides that an indorser's
transfer warranties must be disclaimed in the indorsement, and a disclaimer thereof cannot
otherwise be proven by parol proof. See also LA. R.S. 10:3-403(2) (1983).
13. LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (1983). The stated purpose of section 3-118's rule of construc-
tion is to "preclude a resort to parol evidence for any purpose except reformation of the
instrument." LA. R.S. 10:3-118, U.C.C. comment 1 (1983).
14. Gulf States Fin. Corp. v. Airline Auto Sales, 248 La. 591, 181 So. 2d 36 (1965);
Fudickar v. lnabnet, 176 La. 777, 146 So. 745 (1933); Rice v. Passman, 196 So. 371 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1940); Jonesboro State Bank v. Jones, 160 So. 187 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
15. Supra note 4.
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parties.' 6 Thus, one would expect a ruling of inadmissibility as to parol
evidence of an agreement that a "without recourse" indorsement was to
be treated by the parties as a recourse indorsement,' 7 that an unqualified
indorsement was to be treated as a guaranty of payment,' 8 that one who
has signed a negotiable instrument would not be called on to pay it,' 9
or that the party was signing for a purpose other than to incur liability."
In two recent cases of interest, Louisiana appellate courts addressed
the parol evidence rule in negotiable instruments cases. In Scafidi v.
Johnson2' the Louisiana Supreme Court permitted the defendant to prove,
as a defense of nonperformance of a condition precedent,2" his agree-
ment with the holder that the holder would not call on him to pay the
note he had signed. Historically, such parol evidence has been held
admissible to show that a negotiable instrument was delivered upon a con-
dition precedent, which puts into question the very existence of an obliga-
tion, as opposed to an absolute delivery and obligation that may later
be defeated by the occurrence of an agreed condition. 3 The distinction
between the conditions precedent and subsequent is similar to that be-
tween real defenses and personal defenses in that the condition precedent
agreement denies that an obligation ever came into being, while the con-
dition subsequent denies liability on an obligation that unquestionably did
come into being;2 ' but the line which must be drawn between the two
16. Gulf States Fin. Corp. v. Airline Auto. Sales, 248 La. 591, 181 So. 2d 36 (1965);
cf. Goldsmith v. Parsons, 182 La. 122, 161 So. 175 (1935) (the writing in question held
not to be an integration of the parties' entire agreement, so that the parol evidence rule
did not preclude oral proof of the true terms of that agreement).
17. See Citizens Bank v. North End State Bank, 116 Kan. 303, 226 P. 998 (1924).
The converse is equally true: parol evidence is inadmissible to show that a recourse indorse-
ment was intended to be "without recourse." See, e.g., Kent State Say. Bank v. Campbell,
208 Iowa 341, 223 N.W. 403 (1929); Divelbiss v. Jones, 164 Miss. 111, 144 So. 464 (1932);
First Nat'l Bank v. Wollman, 55 S.D. 244, 225 N.W. 713 (1929).
18. See Lippman v. Alder, 35 Del. 51, 157 A. 433 (1930); Shea v. Patton, 212 Wis.
626, 250 N.W. 424 (1933). A guaranty of payment constitutes a waiver of presentment,
so that the holder need not resort to any other party prior to demanding payment from
the guarantor. LA. R.S. 10:3-416(1) (1983).
19. See, e.g., Randle v. Overland Texarkana Co., 182 Ark. 877, 32 S.W.2d 1064 (1930);
Brown v. Turpin, 229 Ky. 383, 17 S.W.2d 253 (1929); United States Nat'l Bank v. Evans,
296 Pa. 541, 146 A. 126 (1929).
20. See Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Garland, 291 Pa. 297, 139 A. 876 (1927).
21. 420 So. 2d 1113 (La. 1982).
22. LA. R.S. 10:3-306(c) (1983).
23. See Security Nat'l Co. v. Sanders, 60 N.D. 597, 235 N.W. 714 (1931).
24. Parol proof that the instrument was delivered subject to an agreed condition prece-
dent does not actually contradict the terms of the instrument, for the terms allegedly would
be without legal efficacy in view of the condition. See First Methodist Episcopal Church
v. Soden, 131 Wash. 228, 229 P. 534 (1924) (parishioner was contemplating a sale of his
business at the time he made a pledge to the plaintiff-church, and he told the church's
representative that the note would be no good if he did sell the business; held, the note
was delivered on a condition precedent).
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conditions is a much more difficult one. 25
A similar distinction was drawn implicitly in First Guaranty Bank v.
Bowdle,26 in which the defendant sought to prove that, while his signature
appeared to signify the unconditional engagement of a maker,2 7 the payee-
bank had in fact agreed at the time he signed that the signature was,
in essence, only the conditional engagement of a guarantor of collection. 28
The defendant's testimony came in without objection, but the majority
of the court nevertheless opined that it was "entirely admissible." 29 That
dictum runs afoul of prior Louisiana jurisprudence, 0 making the Bowdle
case not entirely reliable on the parol evidence issue."
The significance of the Scafidi and Bowdle decisions should not be
overestimated; such conditional agreements as are found in the two cases
have no effect on holders in due course and more often than not will
be inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, Scafidi and Bowdle not-
25. The Scafidi decision seems indistinguishable from a number of other decisions holding
that such a condition cannot be shown. See, e.g., Jackson v. Sample, 234 Ala. 75, 173
So. 510 (1937); Dodo v. Stocker, 74 Colo. 95, 219 P. 222 (1923); Dacus v. Grimes, 624
S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). Compare Roberts v. Greig, 15 Colo. App. 378, 62
P. 574 (1900) (parol evidence admissible to show that the note was delivered on the condi-
tion that it would be paid from the proceeds of a business, and if there were no proceeds
the note would be returned and destroyed) with Jackson v. Sample, 234 Ala. 75, 173 So.
510 (1937) (evidence of an agreement that the note would be paid only if the earnings of
a business were sufficient therefor held inadmissible).
26. 426 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
27. LA. R.S. 10:3-413(1) (1983).
28. LA. R.S. 10:3-416(2) (1983). One who adds "collection guaranteed" or equivalent
words to his signature on a negotiable instrument engages only that, if the instrument is
not paid when it is due, he will pay it according to its tenor, so long as the holder has
first reduced his claim against the maker (in Bowdle a co-maker) to judgment and execution
has been returned unsatisfied or it is otherwise apparent that it is useless to proceed against
the maker. The guarantor of collection can be likened to a surety having the plea of discus-
sion. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3046.
29. The dissenting opinion of Judge Savoie stresses that, since the defendant had expressly
waived all pleas of discussion, his proof would be contradictory to the clear terms of the
note, and that, in any case, it is the business of those who sign an instrument to know
what it is they have obligated themselves to do. 426 So. 2d at 648 (Savoie, J., dissenting).
30. In both People's Bank v. Cookston, 142 So. 285 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932) and
Jonesboro State Bank v. Jones, 160 So. 187 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935), parol evidence of
an agreement virtually identical to that in Bowdle was held inadmissible as an attempt to
vary the terms of the note.
31. In First Progressive Bank v. Costanza, 427 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983),
the plaintiff-bank's failure to object also permitted the defendant to introduce evidence that
the note she signed was to be paid only if she was able to sell her house. Although the
condition precedent distinction could perhaps be applied in Costanza, prior Louisiana cases
have applied the parol evidence rule to similar factual settings. In Fudickar v. Inabnet,
176 La. 777, 146 So. 745 (1933), for example, defendant-maker was not permitted to prove
that the note in litigation had been given to the payee-plaintiff with the understanding that
it would be paid out of the proceeds of gas sold from the well the maker was to sink
on the payee's property, which well, in fact, never produced any gas.
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withstanding. The distinctions drawn by the two cases to avoid the parol
evidence rule seem, however, to be what the late Professor Dainow in
another context called "tweedle-dum or tweedle-dee.
' 32
The Negotiable Status of Drafts Payable "Upon Acceptance"
Insurance companies habitually pay the claims of insureds by issuing
a draft payable "upon acceptance." Because such drafts are frequently
also expressly payable "in full settlement and satisfaction" of the insured's
claims,33 it could be argued that the "upon acceptance" language refers
to the insured-claimant's acceptance of the insurer's settlement offer.
3 4
It usually is obvious, however, that the "upon acceptance" language refers
to the act of the named drawee in assuming liability by signing the draft."
In either case courts have not often examined the legal effect of the
"upon acceptance" language, undoubtedly because most such drafts are
issued to good faith claimants to whom payment is properly made. That
was not the case in First National Bank v. South Carolina Insurance Co. ,36
where the first circuit did offer an analysis of the "upon acceptance"
language.
The drawer-insurance company in the First National Bank case had
issued a draft ordering the drawee to "upon acceptance, pay to the order
of Kevlin Owens" the sum of $5584. The insurance company subsequent-
ly discovered that the Owens claim was fraudulent and ordered the drawee
not to pay the draft. The dishonored draft was returned to the First
National Bank, to whom Owens had negotiated it.
The UCC affords substantial protection to the First National Bank,
a bank on the receiving end of a dishonored item. If the Owens transfer
could be viewed as a deposit for collection, the bank could charge-back
the amount of the draft,37 or it could recover against Owens either on
the basis of the depositor's engagement to the depositary bank to "take
32. Dainow, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term-
Prescription, 25 LA. L. REV. 352, 356 (1964).
33. See Hersbergen, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977
Term-Commercial Paper and Bank Deposits and Collections, 38 LA. L. REV. 384, 392-94
(1978); Hersbergen, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-
Commercial Paper and Bank Deposits and Collections, 40 LA. L. REV. 606, 611-15 (1980).
34. See Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 99 Mich. App.
338, 297 N.W.2d 656 (1980); Glosser Stores, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Pa.
D. & C.2d 16 (1968).
35. Merson v. Sun Ins. Co., 44 Misc. 2d 131, 253 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Civ. Ct. 1964); cf.
Oneida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 76 Misc. 2d 1062, 352 N.Y.S.2d 870
(Sup. Ct. 1974) (insurance company drew a draft payable "at sight when approved"; held,
drawer's approval was intended, and that occurred on issuance in light of the demand nature
of the draft).
36. 432 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
37. LA. R.S. 10:4-212 (1983).
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up" the dishonored item38 or on the basis of the depositor's indorsement
engagement.39 Alternatively, the transfer to the bank can be viewed as
a negotiation, in which case the bank, as a holder of the dishonored draft,
can recover against the drawer and any unqualified indorsers." ° The First
National Bank sued the drawer, South Carolina Insurance Company, alleg-
ing that the plaintiff bank was the holder in due course of the dishonored
draft. The insurance company, having a defense' not assertable against
a holder in due course," countered with the argument that the "upon
acceptance" language conditioned its order, rendering the draft non-
negotiable and making the bank, therefore, a mere assignee 3 against whom
its defense would be assertable.
On this res nova issue, the first circuit ruled that the draft was
negotiable and that First National Bank was a holder in due course."
The insurance company had drawn the draft on its own parent
corporation 5 as drawee, in effect making the draft one drawn on itself.
In such a case, the first circuit reasoned, the draft is accepted by the
very act of the drawer in drawing it, rendering the "upon acceptance"
language without legal significance and of no effect on the negotiable
nature of the draft.
The result obtained in First National Bank is the correct one, but
the reasoning is slightly flawed. The draft payable "upon acceptance"
is negotiable whether or not the drawer and drawee are, in legal con-
templation, one and the same. The language "upon acceptance" merely
states on the face of the instrument that which is consistent with what
the law implies regarding the relationship between drawer, holder and
38. LA. R.S. 10:4-207(2) (1983).
39. Although LA. R.S. 10:4-207(2) makes a depositor's indorsement superfluous for
purposes of recoupment against the depositor himself, it is customary to require such an
indorsement due to its relationship to the ostensible manifestation of title. In short, if the
depositor's indorsement is missing, the payor or drawee may properly decline to pay. Addi-
tionally, the lack of a depositor's signature could cripple the collecting bank's attempt to
recover against indorsers prior in time to the depositor. See United Overseas Bank v. Veneers,
Inc., 375 F. Supp. 596 (D. Md. 1973).
40. LA. R.S. 10:3-413(2), :3-414(1) (1983).
41. The defenses of fraud, contractual nonliability and doubtless others would be available
to the insurer in such circumstances.
42. LA. R.S. 10:3-305(2) (1983).
43. The rights of a holder in due course under LA. R.S. 10:3-305 are premised upon
satisfaction of the requisites of LA. R.S. 10:3-302(1) by a holder: "a holder in due course
is a holder who takes the instrument ...." Id. To be a holder, LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (1983)
(definition of "holder"), one must be in possession of an "instrument," defined by the
UCC as a "negotiable instrument." LA. R.S. 10:3-102(l)(e) (1983).
44. The ruling necessitated a reversal of the trial court's judgment in favor of the in-
surance company.
45. The drawer insurance company was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the named drawee,
"Seibels, Bruce Group."
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drawee." A promise or order otherwise unconditional is not made condi-
tional by the presence of such implied conditions. 7 Moreover, the idea
that a draft drawn on the drawer is "accepted by the very fact of draw-
ing it" is a pre-UCC"I idea which that act now arguably undermines. 9
The draft drawn on the drawer is, however, afforded special treatment
by the UCC; such an instrument is said to be effective as a note."
Therefore, the "upon acceptance" language can be viewed as a superfluous
anomaly, an ambiguous phrase to be construed against the drawer5 or,
in an appropriate case, a reference to the payee-insured's agreement to
the settlement terms.5 2
ITEMS IN THE BANK COLLECTION PROCESS
Payor Bank Accountability
When the First National Bank received the dishonored draft of South
Carolina Insurance Company, it chose to exercise its rights as a holder
and sue one of the parties whose signature appeared on the instrument. 3
Collecting banks do not have to be holders to exercise the right of charge-
back"4 or rights arising from warranties and the depositor engagement;55
46. Absent a special agreement to the contrary, a drawee has no liability to either the
drawer or to the holder until such time as the drawee becomes an acceptor. LA. R.S.
10:3-409(1) (1983). Of course, should the drawee obey the order to pay, the payment very
likely would be final and irretrievable under LA. R.S. 10:3-418. Presentment for acceptance
is, of course, a common requirement for a draft and a requirement sanctioned by the UCC.
LA. R.S. 10:3-501(l)(a) (1983).
47. LA. R.S. 10:3-105(1)(a) (1983); State v. Phelps, 125 Ariz. 114, 608 P.2d 51 (Ct.
App. 1980); Canal Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 596 S.W.2d 710 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979);
Lialios v. Home Ins. Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 740, 410 N.E.2d 193 (1980); Merson v. Sun
Ins. Co., 44 Misc. 2d 131, 253 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Civ. Ct. 1964); Falk's Food Basket v. Selected
Risks Ins. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 522, 257 A.2d 359 (1969).
48. The First National Bank opinion relies for the quoted proposition on Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 279, 146 S.E.2d 79 (1966),
a pre-UCC case which relies, for its part, on 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes, § 171, at 646 (1938).
49. See LA. R.S. 10:3-410(1) (1983).
50. LA. R.S. 10:3-I18(a) (1983). This section recognizes that the liabilities of the drawer
and maker are virtually identical, the only difference being found in the rare events described
in LA. R.S. 10:3-502(1)(b). Equating the draft drawn on the drawer to a promissory note
of the drawer does make the "upon acceptance" language superfluous, so that the "ac-
cepted by the very fact of issuance" cases, see Cable & Wireless v. Yokohama Specie Bank,
191 Misc.-567, 79 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. American
Bankers Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 279, 146 S.E.2d 79 (1966), are, at worst, examples of harmless
error.
51. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1957-1958.
52. See cases cited supra note 34.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
54. LA. R.S. 10:4-212(1) (1983).
55. LA. R.S. 10:4-207(2) (1983).
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banks will exercise such rights whenever the customer's account or his
personal assets make pursuit of him worthwhile. Very often, however,
neither the depositing customer nor the drawer nor any prior indorser
is an economically attractive target for the collecting bank to whom an
item has been returned unpaid by a payor bank. In such cases, the payor
bank may be an attractive target if its handling of the item has exposed
it to "accountability" under UCC sections 4-213(1) or 4-302.56
A payor bank avoids accountability by settling promptly for an in-
coming item and thereafter obeying the UCC command to "pay or return
the item or send notice of dishonor" prior to the bank's midnight
deadline."' The payor bank's primary concern is the expiration of the midnight
deadline, at which time the bank loses its ability to return a not-
properly-payable item. 8 But section 4-302 is not the sole route to account-
ability for a payor bank; under UCC section 4-213(1), a payor bank is
accountable for the amount of the item once it completes the process
of posting." If the payor bank has not retained the item beyond its mid-
night deadline and if it did not complete the process of posting the item
to the drawer's account, does the collecting bank have any way of saddling
the payor bank with liability? The lawyer seeking the answer to the
question soon encounters one of the most controversial UCC banking law
decisions: West Side Bank v. Marine National Exchange Bank.60 Because
56. LA. R.S. 10:4-213(1), :4-302 (1983).
57. LA. R.S. 10:4-302(a) (1983). When a demand item is presented for payment to
a payor bank, the payor bank likewise must act on it promptly. If the payor bank makes
an authorized settlement for an item it has received (otherwise than "over the counter")
before midnight of the banking day of receipt, LA. R.S. 10:4-301(1) permits the payor bank
to revoke the settlement and recover any payment it has made if it so acts before it has
made final payment and before its midnight deadline. If it retains the item beyond midnight
of the banking day of receipt without settling for it, or if after settlement it does not "pay
or return the item or send notice of dishonor" until after its midnight deadline, the payor
bank is accountable for the amount of the item. LA. R.S. 10:4-104(1)(h), :4-105(d), :4-213(1),
:4-301(1), :4-302 (1983). The accountability of a payor bank under section 4-302 is for the
face amount of the item, but the responsibility of a collecting bank for failure to use ordinary
care (usually meaning seasonable action) in handling an item under section 4-202 presents
a matter of proof of damages, whatever be the "amount of the item." See Marcoux v.
Mid-States Livestock, 429 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Iowa 1977), aff'd, 572 F.2d 651 (8th Cir.
1978); LA. R.S. 10:4-103(5) (1983).
58. A payor bank holding a properly payable item beyond its midnight deadline incurs
no detriment from the accountability of section 4-302, since such items can be charged to
the account of the drawer-customer. Sending notice of dishonor is not an alternative to
the payor bank unless the item to be dishonored "is held for protest or is otherwise unavailable
for return." LA. R.S. 10:4-301(1) (1983); Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555 S.W.2d
589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). The issue of payor-bank accountability aside, a notice of dishonor
by a payor bank would be sufficient to measure the recipient's own promptness in giving
his notice of dishonor under LA. R.S. 10:3-508(1).
59. Completion of the process of posting is an instance of "final payment," as is pay-
ment in cash. LA. R.S. 10:4-213(1) (1983).
60. 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968).
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the issues showcased by the West Side Bank decision are virtually certain
to arise in Louisiana, an understanding of the case is an important ingre-
dient in the acumen of Louisiana bank lawyers.
West Side Bank presented through the Milwaukee clearing house to
Marine National Exchange Bank (Marine Bank) a check drawn by Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis on its account at Marine Bank and deposited
by the payee in its account at West Side Bank. Marine Bank returned
the check to West Side Bank as a "payment stopped" item prior to Marine
Bank's midnight deadline, but West Side Bank alleged that Marine Bank
had made final payment under UCC section 4-213(1) by completing the
process of posting6' the check prior to the stop-order and was, therefore,
accountable to West Side Bank. The process of posting is the "usual pro-
cedure followed by a payor bank in determining to pay an item and in
recording the payment"; 62 Marine Bank argued in opposition to West Side
Bank's motion for summary judgment that its "usual procedure" included
a final exercise of judgment prior to the midnight deadline to determine
whether any entries to the drawer's account should be reversed or errors
corrected. Since that allegation raised issues of fact, West Side Bank's
motion was denied.
The West Side Bank decision rests on a bifurcated premise: on the
one hand, the process of posting was not completed because the "cor-
recting or reversing an entry or erroneous action" language of UCC sec-
tion 4-109(e)63 means, as Marine Bank argued, that as part of its usual
posting procedure a payor bank can reverse or correct prior judgmental
entries as well as prior mechanical or clerical entries; on the other hand,
UCC section 4-303(1) gave West Side Bank no remedy,6" so that it was
limited to the remedy of UCC section 4-213. The interpretation of sec-
tion 4-109(e) by the Wisconsin court-the explicit premise of the West
61. LA. R.S. 10:4-109 (1983). The returned item was stamped "payment stopped" and
"cancelled in error," after Marine Bank's computer run had revealed no deficiencies and
the item had been photographed, stamped "paid," cancelled and filed in Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis' (Paine, Webber) account for return as a cancelled item. Thereafter, but
prior to the midnight deadline, Paine, Webber had ordered payment stopped, and Marine
Bank followed the order.
62. LA. R.S. 10:4-109 (1983). The process of posting is said to include
one or more of the following or other steps as determined by the bank: (a) verifica-
tion of any signature; (b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available; (c) affixing
a "paid" or other stamp; (d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's account;
(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action with respect to the item.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. In following Paine, Webber's stop payment order, Marine Bank reversed its deci-
sion to pay.
64. Although Marine Bank had reversed its action on the Paine, Webber check prior
to the midnight deadline in avoidance of accountability under UCC section 4-213(1), it did
so in ostensible violation of UCC section 4-303(1). See infra text accompanying notes 68-84.
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Side Bank case-was unpopular with legal commentators."5 But, while the
key language of section 4-109(e) may not have been intended to mean
what the West Side Bank decision says that it means, that premise is so
narrow as to be relatively insignificant, since a bank desiring to use West
Side Bank to avoid accountability under section 4-213(1) must be prepared
to prove at trial that such reversals or corrections are in fact part of the
bank's usual procedure or process of posting and that, moreover, the par-
ticular reversal or correction was done in good faith 6  and prior to the
midnight deadline. In any event, this feature of West Side Bank has
gathered few adherents."7
The implicit premise of West Side Bank-that UCC section 4-303(1)
was not available to West Side Bank or any other collecting bank-raises
a much more significant issue for bank lawyers. The "milestones" of sec-
tion 4-303(l) 6 exist because a check is not considered to be an assign-
ment of the drawer's funds; 9 consequently, the holder has no rights, as
such, to payment by the drawee. Between the time of issuance of the
check and either completion of the process of posting or passage of the
drawee's midnight deadline (at either of which times the holder would
have rights against the drawee under UCC sections 4-213 and 4-302, respec-
tively), various claims may be asserted to the funds in the drawer's
account-funds that would, perhaps, otherwise be available for payment
65. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 16-4, at 623-24; § 17-7, at 700-03 (1980); Malcolm, Reflections on West
Side Bank: A Draftsman's View, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 23 (1968); Comment, Uniform Com-
mercial Code-Article Four-Process of Posting Not Complete Until Midnight Deadline,
20 S.C.L. REV. 118 (1968); Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Bank Deposits and Col-
lections-Process of Posting Incomplete Until Time for Reversal of Entries Has Expired,
17 CATH. U.L. REV. 508 (1968). But see Note, Banks-Final Payment-Uniform Commer-
cial Code Section 4-109 or Clearinghouse Rule?, 1968 WIs. L. REV. 946.
The West Side Bank's "theory of the case" was payor bank accountability under sec-
tion 4-213(1); in fairness to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the matter of what rights, if
any, West Side Bank had under UCC section 4-303(1) was not at issue. In Louisiana, the
court itself could apply LA. R.S. 10:4-303(1) to the facts-if that section in fact admits
of a remedy for the collecting bank. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 862.
66. LA. R.S. 10:1-203 (1983).
67. See H. Schultz & Sons v. Bank of Suffolk County, 439 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 449 F. Supp. 616 (D.S.C.
1976). But cf. Security Trust Co. v. National Bank, 79 Misc. 2d 523, 358 N.Y.S.2d 943
(Sup. Ct. 1974) (reversal of a true "erroneous" entry permitted, citing West Side Bank);
Van Senus Auto Parts v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-Wyoming, 116 Mich. App. 342, 323 N.W.2d
391 (1982) (correction of an erroneous stamping of "paid" on the back of the item).
68. The section 4-303(1) milestones are: (a) acceptance or certification of the item; (b)
payment of the item in cash; (c) irrevocable settlement for the item; (d) completion of the
process of posting the item to the indicated account or a decision to pay evidenced by
examination of the indicated account and by action; (e) the advent of accountability by
final payment under LA. R.S. 10:4-213 or by late return under LA. R.S. 10:4-302.
69. LA. R.S. 10:3-409 (1983).
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to the holder. The drawer's countermand of his order asserts a claim to
the funds, as do the drawer's judgment creditor's writ of garnishment,
the drawee's right to set off against the funds in the account any in-
debtedness owed by drawer to drawee, and the claims of drawer's legal
representatives such as the trustee in bankruptcy. These events, or claims,
are customarily referred to as the "four legals." Section 4-303(1) aids
the drawee bank by providing a way to readily determine control of, and
hence priorities to, the drawer's funds: when any of the actions, or
"milestones" listed in section 4-303(1) have occurred, the claim or "legal"
coming to the drawee thereafter is too late to modify or undo the action
taken or its effect.' 0
While most of the milestones in section 4-303(1) for determining claim
priorities are the same as the "events" under section 4-213 determinative
of the occurrence of "final payment,"" there is this important difference:
if the drawee has not completed the process of posting the item to the
indicated account but has "evidenced by examination of [the] indicated
account and by action its decision to pay the item,"', the claims that
subsequently arrive to compete for the funds represented by the check
have arrived too late to modify the bank's right or duty to pay the item
or charge the account,' 3 even though accountability by virtue of final pay-
ment has not yet occurred. The drawer's stop payment order arguably
arrived after this point in the West Side Bank case, so that Marine Bank
could have refused to obey the stop order had it chosen to do so.
Because each of the milestones of section 4-303(1), except the "deci-
sion to pay" situation, also creates a right of action for the holder of
the check in question, the issue left unresolved by West Side Bank is
whether a collecting bank or anyone other than the drawer, his judgment
creditors or legal representatives can assert a violation of the section
4-303(1) "decision to pay" milestone as an independent basis for liability
70. For example, if completion of the process of posting on check A has occurred,
the funds represented by check A are no longer deemed in the drawer's account or under
his control; therefore, those funds are beyond the reach of the drawer who arrives at the
bank one minute later with a stop order on the check. Likewise, however, the funds
represented by check A are beyond the reach of the drawee bank by setoff and of the
drawer's judgment creditors by writ-even though the drawee still has possession of the
check and of the funds it represents, and the holder most likely is at that point unaware
that he now has rights, not to the check, but to an accounting under LA. R.S. 10:4-213(l).
See Barnett Bank v. Capital City First Nat'l Bank, 348 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977); Gibbs v. Gerberich, 1 Ohio App. 2d 93, 203 N.E.2d 851 (1964).
71. Payment of the item in cash is an "event" of final payment and a section 4-303(1)
milestone, as are irrevocable settlement for the item, completion of the process of posting,
and retention of the item beyond the midnight deadline.
72. LA. R.S. 10:4-303(1)(d) (1983) (emphasis added).
73. Compare Yandell v. White City Amusement Park, 232 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass.
1964) with Gibbs v. Gerberich, 1 Ohio App. 2d 93, 203 N.E.2d 851 (1964).
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of the payor bank. Stated in terms of the facts of West Side Bank, it
seems clear that under section 4-303(1) the Marine Bank could have de-
clined to honor the customer's stop order, or refused to include the funds
represented by the check in responding to the writ of garnishment served
on it by a judgment creditor of the customer."4 But it must be observed
that the section 4-303(1) "legals" involve claimants having a legally
recognizable right to the funds in the account. It is "knowledge" or
"notice" of the rights or claims of the drawer's trustee in bankruptcy,
for example, that triggers section 4-303(1); likewise, the drawer's right
to issue a stop-order is premised on his claim as a creditor to the funds
in his account, while the judgment creditor's "legal process served" on
the drawee is a creditor's "right." The drawee has a duty to obey the
stop-order, the writ of garnishment or the order of a trustee in bank-
ruptcy. But is the holder of the deposited and uncertified item ever a
claimant prior to the advent of accountability of the drawee under either
UCC section 4-213, or UCC section 4-302?
Professors James White and Robert Summers apparently believe that
a violation of the "decision to pay" test of section 4-303(1) itself pro-
vides an independent basis for a claim by the holder. 5 Logically, White
and Summers are correct, for the rationale of section 4-303(l)'s decision
to pay test is that the legals come too late whenever the posting process
reaches a point at which it can be said that the funds represented by the
check are no longer effectively within the control of the drawer. In whose
control are the funds at this point? The answer cannot be "the drawee"
because the decision to pay certainly forecloses the drawee's own right
of setoff, just as it does the drawer's stop order; the answer should be,
by default, "the holder." Moreover, the holder is the only party who
can effectively assert a violation of section 4-303(1) in the case of a stop-
order (West Side Bank) or a drawee setoff that is executed in violation
of section 4-303(1).7" But the holder has no claim to assert against the
funds in the drawer's account since no one is primarily liable to the holder
of an uncertified check; therefore, one may reason, he does not have stand-
ing to assert the drawee's violation of section 4-303(1). Moreover, when
a legal "comes too late" to modify the bank's "right or duty," does
not section 4-303(1) refer to the bank's right to charge the account on
a properly payable item and its right to return a not-properly-payable item
within the midnight deadline, both of which rights surely can be waived;
74. See H. Schultz & Sons v. Bank of Suffolk County, 439 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (completion of the process of posting).
75. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, § 17-7, at 702-03.
76. Certainly the drawer, by definition a debtor in default in such cases, is not in
an ideal position to complain that the bank failed without justification to follow his order,
LA. R.S. 10:4-401 (1983), and use the funds in the account to pay the item. A judgment
creditor of the drawer gains nothing by pointing out the violation, for he finds himself
arguing that had the bank obeyed section 4-303(1) it would have paid the holder.
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and does not section 4-303(1) refer to the bank's contractual duty to the
customer to pay in accordance with his order and the bank's statutory
duties to the trustee in bankruptcy and the judgment creditor armed with
a writ? Unless it is inherent in section 4-303(1) itself, no such duties are
owed to the holder until the advent of accountability.
Until recently, the issue of whether section 4-303(l)(d) states an in-
dependent basis of payor bank liability has been one of commentary only."
Within approximately the last two years, however, decisions in two federal
court cases have adopted the view that a holder may sue a drawee-payor
bank which violates section 4-303(l)(d). In fact, Pittsburgh National Bank
v. United States78 expressed that section 4-303 is intended to resolve only
conflicting claims involving a holder and has no application at all to
disputes between competing claims when neither claimant is the holder.
First Jersey National Bank v. National Bank of North America79 did not
expressly go so far, but it did adopt the view that section 4-303 was de-
signed to settle priority disputes between claimants to the fund and the
holder. In the First Jersey case, a payor bank exercised the right of setoff
against the account of a drawer-customer in failing financial condition,
which caused a dishonor and return of three checks to the holder, the
depositary bank. The payor bank moved to dismiss the depositary bank's
section 4-303(1)(d) claim. Relying squarely on the "decision to pay"
language of section 4-303(1)(d) and on the argument that section 4-303(1)
would otherwise be superfluous, the federal district court found that, in
the case of the "four legals," a special rule of liability, in addition to
the accountability rules of sections 4-213 and 4-302, was intended. Similar-
ly, the Pittsburgh National Bank case arose when the Internal Revenue
Service sought to utilize section 4-303(1) to avoid the effect of the rule
in Pennsylvania that a bank's right to setoff is "exercised" by operation
of law on maturity of the drawer's indebtedness, permitting a bank to
avoid a federal tax levy. The court held, in essence, that a nonholder
claimant has no standing to raise the independent liability of a payor bank
under section 4-303(1). Presumably, even White and Summers would not
concur in. that result.8 0
77. Favoring the independent basis of liability are J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note
65, § 17-7, at 702-03; Malcolm, Reflections on West Side Bank: A Draftsman's View, 18
CATH. U.L. REV. 23, 23-31 (1968). The view that the holder does not benefit from section
4-303(l) was offered by Leary & Tarlow, Reflections on Articles 3 and 4 for a Review
Committee, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 919, 929-33 (1975).
78. 657 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1981).
79. 563 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
80. White and Summers, for example, discuss without disapproval Yandell v. White
City Amusement Park, 232 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass. 1964), a section 4-303(l)(d) case in
which a garnishor contended that a payor bank had not turned over all the funds actually
in the account. The bank-not the garnishor-successfully relied on section 4-303(l) in Yandell,
but not being a holder, could the bank have done so under the Pittsburgh National Bank
rationale? J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, § 17-7, at 703.
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It is not possible to predict with accuracy how Louisiana courts will
resolve the section 4-303(l)(d) issue. There was no comparable prior
uniform statutory provision, and, as White and Summers suggest in
reference to the disagreement over the issue of holder standing under the
section: "Clearly the drafters [of the section] and the critics failed to com-
municate effectively with one another during the drafting." 8 ' Certainly,
the First Jersey decision that a holder may sue under section 4-303(1)
is logical and consistent with the description of the section in the UCC
comments. The Pittsburgh National Bank case, on the other hand, may
go too far.
For the banker, the key to section 4-303(1) is to establish clearly what
UCC section 4-109 refers to as the "usual procedure followed" by the
bank in its process of posting and then to follow it time after time. That
may mean equal treatment for all customers, whether "favored customers"
or not. One of the- "legals" most laden with potential liability is the payor-
bank's right of setoff.2 If a bank exercises a right of setoff in an un-
81. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 65, § 17-7, at 702. There is an indication
in Shreveport Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Bank of Commerce, 405 So. 2d 842 (La. 1981) that
the view of Professors Leary and Tarlow, Leary & Tarlow, supra note 77, at 929-30, may
be favored in Louisiana. Shreveport Production Credit Association (Credit Association) was
the holder of a $31,894 check drawn by Ryder on the Bank of Commerce. Upon arrival
of the check at the Bank of Commerce there were insufficient funds in the account to
pay it, but sixteen *checks payable to Ryder in the identical amount of the Credit Associa-
tion check had been deposited into the Ryder account and were being collected at the time.
The Bank of Commerce properly dishonored Ryder's check and, when collection of the
sixteen checks was completed, the Bank of Commerce setoff against the account an in-
debtedness of Ryder to the bank of $26,088. The Credit Association sought to prove that
the bank had no special mandate from Ryder to authorize a setoff, see infra note 82, and
although LA. R.S. 10:4-303(1) is not involved, the answer of the Louisiana Supreme Court
is germane to the First Jersey decision:
We find that the plaintiff has no cause of action to challenge the setoff of
Dr. Ryder's account. The agreement to permit compensation was between the
[bank] and Dr. Ryder. The Credit Association was at no time a party to the
agreement and [because a payor bank is not liable to a payee unless it certifies
the check or becomes accountable for it] is not in the position to raise the non-
existence or invalidity of such an agreement in behalf of Dr. Ryder.
405 So. 2d at 846. Similarly, Professor Leary explains:
The function of [section 4-303(1)], then, is to settle disputes between a payor
bank, its depositor and third parties other than holders of items in course of
collection. This conclusion results because there is no statutory abrogation of the
rule that a drawee is not liable to a holder unless it has accepted the item, or
has agreed to pay, or has paid it. The only exception found is :the imposition
of accountability under Sections 4-302(a) and 4-213 when the midnight deadline
for a check is missed.
Leary & Tarlow, supra note 77, at 931.
82. In Louisiana a bank has no right, independent of an express agreement to that
effect, to apply deposited funds to the debts of the depositor. See, e.g., SEC v. Affiliated
Inv. Corp., 298 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1969); Thomas
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timely manner in violation of section 4-303(l)(d), cannot the drawer
rightfully sue for any wrongful dishonor that results? Will not the
holder-normally lacking any avenue of attack in a dishonor case-be
successful under the Pittsburgh National Bank ruling? Raymer v. Bay State
National Bank 3 involved wrongful dishonor caused by such a setoff. The
court awarded only nominal damages for the wrongful dishonor. However,
because the act of setoff (and resulting dishonor of twenty-six checks)
followed assurances by the bank that the drawer could continue to draw
checks without interference and was done despite the existence of excess
collateral for the loan in question, the court held that the setoff violated
the Massachusetts deceptive practices act. That act, like the Louisiana
deceptive practices act, mandates an award of attorneys' fees.'
THE BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
Properly Payable Items
MJZ Corp. v. Gulfstream First Bank & Trust" addressed the following
issue: May a drawee-payor bank properly pay checks drawn against a
subsequently closed account and recoup the payment from the former
drawer of the closed account? The bank may overdraft an item against
the active account that has insufficient funds and recoup the amount of
the overdraft. 6 But a checking account is contractual in nature, and when
the relationship ends,' so does the drawee-bank's authority to create an
overdraft. Absent the overdraft authority and lacking any stipulation in
its customer agreement permitting the post-closure honoring of checks,
the Florida court held that the drawee had acted as a "volunteer" and
v. Marine Bank & Trust Co., 156 La. 941, 101 So. 315 (1924); Murdock & Williams v.
Citizens' Bank, 23 La. Ann. 113 (1871).
83. 424 N.E.2d 515 (Mass. 1981).
84. The Raymer case should be compared to Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v.
Phillips, 415 So. 2d 973 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), discussed in the same forum last year.
Hersbergen, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Banking Law, 43 LA. L. REv. 309, 321-25
(1982).
85. 420 So. 2d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
86. LA. R.S. 10:4-401(1) (1983). The drawing of an item against an insufficient account
is treated as an implied request for a loan from the drawee in the amount necessary to
pay the item and an implied promise to repay the loan; *therefore, the act of paying the
overdraft is actually a loan to the drawer of the amount of the overdraft. See Talbot v.
First Nat'l Bank, 106 Iowa 361, 76 N.W. 726 (1898); Caddo Trust & Say. Bank v. Bush,
182 So. 397 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
87. The drawer's account was closed and the contractual relationship ceased in MJZ
prior to the presentment of two checks issued by the drawer six months earlier (and prior
to closing the account) as signed but undated checks given in connection with the sale of
a business by the drawer. The drawee had a policy of continuing to honor checks for thirty
days after closure of an account, as a convenience to customers who might otherwise be
embarrassed by dishonored items.
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had no legal basis to recoup the payment from the former customer. The
MJZ case recalls an all too frequently recurring theme: the inadequacy
of the coverage of the typical bank-customer agreement.88 The Florida
court made it clear in MJZ that banks can maintain a thirty-day "open
account after closure" policy, but the customer is not bound thereby unless
he has notice of it. A stipulation in the bank-customer agreement is the
best place for such notice.
While the point made by MWJZ is a valid one and while some support
exists for the idea that a knowledgeable volunteer payor of an obligation
cannot recover the payment,89 the case is not a reliable one in all situa-
tions. In the first place, in order to prevent unjust enrichment, UCC sec-
tion 4-407 permits a payor bank, having paid an item under circumstances
giving a basis for objection by the drawer, to be subrogated to the rights
of the payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer either
on the item or under the transaction out of which the item arose." Of
course, the payee's shoes are not invariably worth slipping into. In the
second place, payment to a payee is not invariably beyond retrieval by
the drawee-payor, 9  and section 4-407 permits the payor bank to be
subrogated to the rights, if any, of the drawer against the payee. 2
The Customer's Right to Stop Payment
When the drawee-payor bank does not obey a customer's valid and
timely9 stop payment order, the bank typically will defend on one or
both of two fronts: first, that the customer has failed in his burden of
establishing his loss"' since there was a holder in due course95 of the stopped
item who would have successfully recovered against the customer96
had the stop order been obeyed;97 second, that UCC section 4-407 applies,
88. See Hersbergen, supra note 84, at 309-20; Hersbergen, Developments in the Law,
1979-1980-Banking Law, 41 LA. L. REv. 313, 330-32 (1981).
89. Smith v. Noble Drilling Co., 272 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. La. 1967).
90. LA. R.S. 10:4-407(b) (1983). Since a check is a form of a draft, a court could
well say that the drawing of a draft carries with it the implied obligation to repay the
drawee who, although he has no obligation to do so, LA. R.S. 10:3-409(1), has, in fact,
followed the order of the drawer and paid the draft. See Henderson, Terry & Co. v. Thorn-
ton, 37 Miss. 448 (1859).
91. LA. R.S. 10:3-418 (1983). But see Smith v. Noble Drilling Co., 272 F. Supp. 321
(E.D. La. 1967).
92. LA. R.S. 10:4-407(c) (1983).
93. LA. R.S. 10:4-303(1) (1983).
94. LA. R.S. 10:4-403(3) (1983).
95. Typically the depositary bank is a holder in due course of the item it is presenting.
See LA. R.S. 10:4-208-:4-209 (1983).
96. LA. R.S. 10:3-413(2) (1983).
97. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp.
790 (D. Mass. 1958); see generally Thomas v. Marine Midland Tinkers Nat'l Bank, 86 Misc.
2d 284, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Civ. Ct. 1976).
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subrogating the payor bank to the rights of the payee or other holder
and perhaps placing the payor in holder in due course shoes. When a
written stop order has expired, the check in question will be stale, so
that a good faith payment can be charged to the customer's account. 8
When a great deal of time has passed since the check was paid, the allega-
tion that the payment was improper can be swept under the rug by asser-
tion of the applicable prescriptive period. The customer in Johnny Turcich,
Jr., Inc. v. First National Bank99 argued unsuccessfully that the applicable
period was ten years under Civil Code article 3544. The fifth circuit, with
Strother v. National American Bank' 0 for guidance, held that the action
had prescribed in five years under Civil Code article 3540.
Had Turcich involved an alteration or the forgery of a signature, the
UCC itself could have precluded such an assertion in a much shorter
period.'"' Furthermore, the bank-customer agreement can shorten the
statutory period in some cases.' 2 But, in the final analysis, both Turcich
and the Strother case on which it leans seem to be on shaky ground.
The fourth circuit conceded in Strother that the case was a "conversion"
action which, had it arisen after January 1, 1975, would have been under
UCC section 3-419(4)." ' Conversion is a tortious act;'0 4 the trial court
in Strother was, therefore, arguably correct in applying Civil Code article
3536." ' Likewise, if Turcich involved a failure by the bank to do what
98. LA. R.S. 10:4-403(2), :4-404 (1983). But see Charles Ragusa & Son v. Community
State Bank, 360 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), discussed in Hersbergen, supra note
33, at 40 LA. L. REV. 606-11.
99. 427 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
100. 384 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980). A collecting bank in Strother had cashed
the plaintiff's check contrary to a restrictive indorsement, an act of "conversion" of the
check, now covered by LA. R.S. 10:3-419(4). The court held that Civil Code article 3540
was applicable.
101. LA. R.S. 10:4-406(4) (1983).
102. Compare New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau v. Manufacturer's Hanover
Trust Co., 41 A.D.2d 912, 343 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1973) with State ex rel. Gabalac
v. Firestone Bank, 46 Ohio App. 2d 124, 346 N.E.2d 326 (1975).
103. LA. R.S. 10:3-419(4) reads: "An intermediary bank or payor bank which is not
a depository bank is not liable solely by reason of the fact that proceeds of an item in-
dorsed restrictively are not paid or applied consistently with the restrictive indorsement of
an indorser other than its immediate transferor."
104. LA. R.S. 10:3-419, UCC comment 2 states: "The action is not on the instrument,
but in tort for its conversion."
105. 384 So. 2d at 593. Civil Code article 3536 states:
The following actions are also prescribed by one year:
That for injurious words, whether verbal or written, and that for damages caused
by animals, or resulting from offenses or quasi offenses.
That which a possessor may institute, to have himself maintained or restored
to his posession, when he has been disturbed or evicted.
That for the delivery of merchandise or other effects, shipped on board any
kind of vessels.
That for damage sustained by merchandise on board ships, or which may have
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it had agreed to do, i.e., follow its customer's orders and stop-orders,' 0 6
then that case, too, is questionable. Strother pointed out that the "actions
on instruments" language of article 3540 is not limited to actions premised
on a signature or otherwise "on" an instrument, but that the word
"on" means that the instrument, whether or not negotiable, is the basis
on which the suit rests."' 7 Stop orders are not "instruments"' ' 10 in this
context and frequently are not even written.
The Customer's Right to Privacy
Disclosure has been one of the major themes of the consumer protec-
tion movement. Bankers in the 1970's became acquainted with disclosure
requirements as to the cost of credit,' 0 9 the liability of cardholders for
unauthorized use of credit cards," ' the denial of credit"' and the terms
and conditions of electronic fund transfers, ' 2 to name a few examples.
As a general proposition, the statutorily-based disclosures are quite com-
patible with the principles of the Louisiana Civil Code.'' 3 In the absence
of a statutory requirement, however, banks historically have not been con-
sidered to be fiduciaries and have no abiding duty of disclosure."'
However, what the courts call "special circumstances" may dictate that
such a relationship and duty of disclosure do exist in a given case." 5 In
Tokarz v. Frontier Federal Savings & Loan Association,' I the Washington
Court of Appeals was confronted with the allegation that a financial in-
stitution should have disclosed to a home mortgage customer certain facts
within the institution's knowledge which would have alerted the customer
to the financial difficulties of the builder-contractor the customer had
engaged to build a home. ' 7 The Washington court did not find the
happened by ships running foul of each other.
Cf. Forman v. First Nat'l Bank, 66 Misc. 2d 432, 320 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
106. From the facts, it appears that the bank overlooked an expired stop order-which
act would not violate the bank customer agreement in any event. See Charles Ragusa &
Son v. Community State Bank, 360 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
107. 384 So. 2d at 594.
108. See LA. R.S. 10:3-102(1)(e), :4-104(l)(g) (1983).
109. Truth in Lending Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1641 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
110. Id. § 1643.
111. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 601, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m, 1691(d) (1976).
112. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 901, 15 U.S.C. § 1693c (Supp. V 1981).
113. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1958, 2474.
114. See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 1344 (1976).
115. Banks can become fiduciaries in various ways, such as by becoming advisors to
their customers or by their possession of material information known to be unavailable
to customers. See generally id.
116. 33 Wash. App. 456, 656 P.2d 1089 (1983).
117. The financial institution had made previous loans for five homes built by the
contractor-builder, and due to financial difficulties, the builder had been unable to perform
on those five projects, and liens had been filed against the properties in question. The plain-
tiff's experience with the builder was quite similar to that of the previous five borrowers.
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"special circumstances" that impose the fiduciary duty of disclosure.' 8
Bankers should not take undue satisfaction from a case such as
Tokarz; had the home mortgage borrowers asked the right questions," 9
the case could easily have taken a different turn. The element of Tokarz
which weighed most heavily in the balance was that the builder-contractor
was also a customer of the financial institution; thus, disclosure by the
bank to the mortgage borrowers of what it knew about the builder would
have violated the implied obligation of all financial institutions not to
disclose to unauthorized third parties the customer's financial condition
or other private financial information.' 0 There may be no easy way out
of such a conflict of interests.
118. The court also expressed the opinion that the bank had no such information in-
dicative of the financial difficulties of the builder at the time of approval of the Tokarz
loan as would have violated the duty in any event. 33 Wash. App. at 459, 656 P.2d at 1094.
119. "Are you aware of any lien actions against our builder?" would have been a most
interesting question, for example.
120. Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Peterson
v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); Richfield Bank & Trust
Co. v. Sjogren, 309 Minn. 362, 244 N.W.2d 648 (1976). See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d
900 (1963). So long as the financial institution avoids the legal definition of a "consumer
reporting agency," the Fair Credit Reporting Act § 601, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (Supp. V
1981), would not apply to protect the customer's privacy. However, LA. R.S. 9:3571(A)
prohibits financial institutions and businesses offering credit from disseminating "specific
information ...relating to ...any ... information concerning ... financial or credit
transactions" except under certain expressed circumstances. The Louisiana provision does
not apply to general credit information "normally furnished to a credit reporting agency."
LA. R.S. 9:3571(C) (1983).
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